International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of Judges on the Basis of Nationality by Markovic, Milan
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2014
International Criminal Trials and the
Disqualification of Judges on the Basis of
Nationality
Milan Markovic
Texas A&M University School of Law, mmarkovic@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Milan Markovic, International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of Judges on the Basis of Nationality, 13 Wash. U. Global Stud. L.
Rev. 1 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/329
Washington University
Global Studies Law Review
VOLUME 13 NUMBER 1 2014
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES ON THE BASIS
OF NATIONALITY
MILAN MARKOVIC*
ABSTRACT
Judges who sit on the International Criminal Court ("ICC') and other
international criminal tribunals ("ICTs') are nationals of particular
states and are elected to serve largely on the basis of their nationality.
Since the advent of the Nuremberg Tribunal, however, ICTs have
perpetuated the notion that national identity is irrelevant to a judge's
performance of his or her duties.
This Article will contend that judges at the ICC and other ICTs should
not preside over trials concerning crimes allegedly committed by or
against their fellow nationals. Judges should also consider recusing
themselves from cases that strongly implicate the interests of their home
nations. Other international tribunals prohibit judges from adjudicating
cases involving their home nations or otherwise control for national bias
in judging.
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs undoubtedly strive to be independent
and impartial, but they cannot be expected to act as representatives of the
international community and its values in cases where they will be under
psychological and economic pressure to rule in accordance with domestic
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interests. The parties to a conflict are also likely to use a judge's
nationality as a proxy for his or her capacity to be impartial.
INTRODUCTION
International criminal trials have changed significantly since
Nuremberg. Individuals that appear before modern international criminal
tribunals ("ICTs") such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), and International Criminal Court ("ICC") possess far more
rights and protections than did the Nuremberg defendants.' As one
prominent international judge has stated, "while the Nuremberg Tribunal
was hardly a failure from the perspective of due process rights, its
shortcomings inspired its heirs to do better, and the result is a rigorous
commitment to due process across the international criminal courts."2
ICTs are now generally perceived to provide defendants with rights that
equal-or exceed-those provided by domestic courts.3
To ensure that defendants' rights are protected and to protect the
credibility of international criminal trials, all modern ICTs also require
judges to be independent and impartial.4  Whereas the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal did not address the qualifications of judges,
1. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 305-06 (1997) (comparing the Nuremberg Tribunal to the ICTY and
concluding that "[i]n many respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement over its
predecessor"); Michael Newton, Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defense
Bar, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379, 385 (2011) ("The modern defense bar has... evolved to provide
defendants with trial procedures and organizational support necessary to fully preserve their due
process rights."). The Nuremberg Tribunal permitted trials in absentia, applied ex post facto laws, and
did not afford defendants the right to appeal their convictions. See generally Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls
and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 57, 71-78 (1995) (identifying the main criticisms of the Nuremberg trials).
2. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 571 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 925, 927 (2008) ("[International criminal law] is scrupulously generous in the guarantee of
procedural rights, and succeeds in upholding them even for the most unsavory accused."); Letter from
Monroe Leigh, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, to Henry Hyde, Chairman of the H. Comm. on Int'l
Relations (Feb. 21, 2001) (suggesting that the protections of the ICC Statute are "at least as
comprehensive as the American Bill of Rights-in certain cases even more detailed and specific"),
reprinted in Philippe Kirsch, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the International Criminal
Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 501, 505-06 (2007).
4. See Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 271-72 (2003); Tom Dannenbaum,
Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption Governing the International
Judiciary and Why It Must Be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 77, 107 (2012).
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and prohibited any challenges to the composition of the Tribunal, the
statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC contain provisions concerning
judicial independence and impartiality. 6 ICC judges are subject to a code
of ethical conduct that further delineates their obligations of independence
and impartiality.
Despite the attention to defendants' rights and judicial independence
and impartiality, defendants who seek to disqualify judges from
international criminal trials face a high bar. The ICTY affords judges a
"presumption of impartiality," and the defendant "must firmly establish a
reasonable apprehension of bias." ICTR defendants must make a similar
showing to disqualify a judge.9
ICTs have been especially unreceptive to claims that a judge's
nationality can provide a basis for his or her disqualification.10 In
responding to a motion to disqualify a German judge on the basis of "a
long history of conflict between Germans and Serbs,"" the ICTY Appeals
Chamber found that:
The nationalities . . . of Judges of this Tribunal are, and must be,
irrelevant to their ability to hear the cases before them
impartially .... [J]udges' ability to ... consider nothing but the
evidence presented to them in deciding on an individual's guilt
constitutes a touchstone of their role as judges. 12
5. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 3, Aug. 8, 1945, 56 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 41(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res 827, art. 13, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 12, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
7. ICC, Code of Judicial Ethics, arts. 3 & 4, Res. ICC-BD/02-01-05 (Mar. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A62EBCOF-D534-438F-Al28-D3AC4CFDD644/140141/ICCBD
020105 En.pdf.
8. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 196-97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
9. Frangois Karera v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, Judgment, 254 (Feb. 2, 2009);
Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment, 42
(May 26, 2003); Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the Plenary
of the Judges on the "Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge" of 2 April 2012.
10. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for Disqualification, 3
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2003) [hereinafter Seselj Disqualification
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-A, A Report to the Vice-President Pursuant to
Rule 15(b)(ii) Concerning Defence Motion to Disqualify Judge Schomburg from Sitting on Appeal, at
3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 19, 2007).
11. Seselj Disqualification Decision, 2.
12. Id. 3; see also id. 4 ("The policies of the governments of the countries from which judges
3
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Similarly, when the defense team of General Ratko Mladic sought to
disqualify Judge Alfonse Orie on, among other grounds, the grounds that
the indictment against Mladic predominately focused on the Srebrenica
massacre, and Judge Ode "could not detach himself from his Dutch
nationality, and the sentiments that may rise from such a charged
proceeding on a matter that is of great interest to the Dutch State and
people,"13 its motion was dismissed in a three-page decision. 14 The
decision was predicated on a memorandum filed in the matter by Judge
Orie, in which he responded to the charge of national bias as follows:
I am a national of the Netherlands. I was elected as a judge of this
Tribunal by the General Assembly of the United Nations. I am
remunerated for my work for this Tribunal by the United Nations.
In no way do I feel or consider that I have any identification or
partiality with the Netherlands, its Government, any of its officials,
or any individual of Dutch nationality in the performance of my
duties. What binds me is the solemn declaration that I made when I
undertook to fulfill my duties "honourably, faithfully, impartially
and conscientiously." 15
The ICTY may be correct that a judge should not be disqualified from
an international criminal trial because his or her nation has been a
historical antagonist of the defendant's nation. A Dutch judge may also be
capable of impartially presiding over a case involving the Srebrenica
massacre, notwithstanding the impact that Dutch peacekeepers' failure to
protect Srebrenica's civilians has had on the Netherlands and its people.1 6
of the International Tribunal come are, and must be, irrelevant to the carrying out of their judicial
responsibilities.").
13. Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Defence Motion Pursuant to Rule 15(B)
Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of Proceedings, 96 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 11, 2012).
14. See Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Order Denying Defence Motion Pursuant
to Rule 15(B) Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of
Proceedings, at 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2012).
15. Id. at Annex, 60.
16. In 2002, the government of Prime Minister Wim Kok resigned after a report criticized it for
failing to prevent the Srebrenica massacre. See, e.g., Dutch Government Quits Over Srebrenica, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/1933144.stm; Dutch Cabinet Resigns Over
Srebrenica Report, TELEGRAPH (London) (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1391071/
Dutch-cabinet-resigns-over-Srebrenica-report.html. Dutch courts have also recently found that the
Netherlands bears responsibility for the massacre and must pay compensation to some of its victims.
See Martin Banks, Dutch State to Blame for Srebrenica Deaths, Court Rules, TELEGRAPH (London)
(July 5, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8618244/Dutch-state-
to-blame-for-Srebrenica-deaths-court-rules.html.
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It does not follow, however, that ajudge's national identity is irrelevant in
every case.
Judges possess numerous personal characteristics and background
experiences that might affect the performance of their duties. National
identity may not play a determinative or even significant role in the vast
majority of international criminal trials. Nevertheless, because war crime
trials are inherently political1  and often implicate the policies of
governments and rebel groups," there will be some cases that directly
implicate the interests of a judge's home nation. Legal scholars and
political scientists have begun to document the extent to which judges on
international tribunals are biased in favor of their home states,19 and ICT
judges are unlikely to be immune from this phenomenon.
National bias is not merely of theoretical concern for the ICC. ICC
judges, unlike their counterparts at the ICTY and ICTR, will preside over
cases involving their home nations, and a Ugandan judge, Judge Nsereko,
has already participated in an appeal involving Joseph Kony and other
prominent members of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA").20
Judge Nsereko's nationality was not addressed in the proceedings, but the
ICC, by a majority vote of a plenary of its judges, recently denied the
motion of two Sudanese rebels to disqualify a Nigerian judge on the basis
that he shared the nationality of the majority of their alleged victims.21 Are
such actions in the best interests of a court that purports to speak for the
"international community as a whole"? 2 2
17. Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and the Hidden Art of International
Criminal Trial Practice, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 253 (2010); see also Jenia lontcheva Turner, Legal
Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 685, 686 (2010) ("The goals of
international trials are broader and more political than those of ordinary domestic trials.").
18. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 510 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European
Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 417, 425 (2008) (suggesting that ECHR judges
display national bias); Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Biased? 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 604-05 (2005) (suggesting that ICJ judges display national
bias).
20. See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Case No. ICC-02/040A, Judgment on the "Decision on
victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06,
a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06,
a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06" of Pre-Trial
Chamber II, 1 (Feb. 23, 2009).
21. See ICC, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the "Defence Request for the
Disqualification of a Judge" of 2 April 2012, ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, 33 (June 5, 2012). The
judge in question also made statements that arguably appeared to be sympathetic to Sudanese
President Al-Bashir, for whom there is an outstanding ICC warrant. See id. 26.
22. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1) (noting that the ICC's jurisdiction is limited to "the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole"); see also Robert D.
5
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This Article will contend that judges at the ICC and future ICTs should
not preside over international criminal trials involving crimes allegedly
committed by or against their fellow nationals. Judges should also
voluntarily recuse themselves from other cases that strongly implicate the
interests of their states.
These rules are needed because international criminal trials have
different functions than domestic trials, and judges should act as
representatives of the international community as opposed to their national
communities.23 ICT judges may strive to be impartial, but the notion that
they can completely separate themselves from their national polities-
especially in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by, or against,
their fellow nationals-overlooks the psychology and motivations of
judges at the ICC and other ICTs. The parties to a conflict will also
inevitably view a judge's nationality as an indication of his or her
impartiality.
Part I of this Article will address the unique goals and purposes of
ICTs. As scholars have observed, ICTs such as the ICC are not proxies for
domestic judicial mechanisms and should not be seen as such. 24 Rather,
they derive their legitimacy insofar as they speak for the "international
community as a whole" 25 and "the shared values of humanity and shared
interests of states."26 While there will be disagreement as to what these
values and interests are, the ICC and other ICTs should not decide cases
on the basis of domestic values and interests. Indeed, the fact that a given
case is before the ICC or another ICT suggests that national justice has
proven inadequate and legitimizes the exclusion of domestic norms from
the adjudicative process.2
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Iaw
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 54 (2007) ("[T]he
authority and legitimacy of international criminal tribunals derive from and rely on international rather
than local laws and values.").
23. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 55 ("Just as national criminal law conceives of crime as an
offense against the state as a collective . . . so [international criminal law] may be conceived
analogously as concerned principally with the penal interests and values of the international
community as a collective, not local political and social orders.").
24. See, e.g., id. at 52; Margaret M. de Guzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at
the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 305 (2012); see also Philippe Kirsch, The
Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International Criminal Iaw, 22 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 539, 543-44 (2007) (discussing the ICC's role as a "court of last resort").
25. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
26. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53.
27. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(1) (providing that a case is admissible where "[t]he
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution").
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Part II will examine why a judge's nationality is likely to interfere with
his or her ability to act as a representative of the international community
in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or against his or her
fellow nationals. Unlike most other international tribunals, ICTs do not
provide for nationality-based recusals, or the appointment of ad hoc judges
who share the defendant's nationality. Empirical research on other
international tribunals indicates that judges disproportionately rule in favor
of their home states, while not being influenced by geopolitical
considerations more generally.
Part II proceeds to describe the psychological, economic, and structural
reasons that national bias is especially likely to exist in the adjudication of
international criminal trials. The nature of fact-finding and legal analysis
at the ICC and other ICTs also allows judges to give effect to their
national biases. A dissent from a judgment in the Civilian Defense Forces
case ("CDF case") before the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL")
will be used to illustrate this argument.28
Part III will consider whether this Article's focus on nationality might
be counterproductive to the advancement of international criminal justice
and short-sighted given the increasing professionalization 29  and
cosmopolitanism of ICT judges.30 Part III will also seek to explain why
removing judges from cases in which they will be perceived to have the
most interest may actually help to legitimize international criminal trials.
Although current ICT judges may be more professional and cosmopolitan
than their predecessors, this does not assure that they will not exhibit
national bias or that they will represent the international community and
its values effectively. The Part concludes by addressing why automatic
disqualification should be required in cases involving crimes committed
by or against a judge's fellow nationals as opposed to other measures.
28. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 1 (Aug. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter CDF case]. As discussed infra Part II.B.3.b, the Special Court of Sierra Leone was
designed with different goals in mind than institutions such as the ICC, and the service of domestic
judges may have been crucial to the fulfillment of those goals. Nevertheless, the CDF case does
suggest that it may be unrealistic to expect that judges will set aside their national interests even when
they associate with international judges.
29. See generally Allison Danner & Erik Voeten, Who Is Running the International Criminal
Justice System in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 35, 46 (Deborah D. Avant ed., 2010) (noting creation
of a transnational network of ICT judges).
30. Martha Nussbaum defines "cosmopolitanism" as an individual's tendency to see himself or
herself as "a citizen of the world" and to "put[] right before country and universal reason before the
symbols of belonging." Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY? 6, 17 (Joshua Cohen & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2002); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 1 (1999) (suggesting that
national identities are being replaced with more individualistic identities).
7
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International criminal justice is undermined when judges are
consciously or unconsciously conflicted between their duties to the
international community and their duties to their states. The ICC and other
ICTs should recognize that national bias can have a significant impact on
judging and act to protect the impartiality of international criminal trials.
I. THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
CRIMINAL TRIALS
To determine whether judges at the ICC and future ICTs should be
permitted to hear cases that substantially involve their home nations, it is
first necessary to understand the extent to which ICTs differ from
domestic courts.
ICTs and domestic criminal courts both determine whether punishment
is warranted for individuals who are alleged to have committed crimes that
fall under their jurisdictions.31 Under both systems, punishment is
generally viewed as morally justifiable to the extent that it is either
retributivist by reflecting what the perpetrator deserves or consequentialist
by bringing about certain goals.32 Punishment can also have social
meaning and significance.
ICTs and domestic criminal courts differ, however, with respect to the
communities on whose behalf they act. The ICTY and ICTR were created
by the Security Council,34 and the ICC is a treaty-based court composed of
122 state parties.35 These ICTs all purport to act on behalf of the
31. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. (noting that ICC jurisdiction is complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions and that "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes.").
32. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 69 ("Conventional justifications for punishment fall into two
broad categories: crime-control and retributive theories."). Some law scholars have suggested that
international criminal law is heavily skewed towards retribution. See Andrew K. Woods, Moral
Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Dessert, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (2012) ("The
international criminal regime is deeply retributive."); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized
Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 757, 757-58 (2007)
(describing retributivism as a "pervading ideology" among ICTs).
33. Compare Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593
(1996) (suggesting that in the domestic context "[p]unishment ... is a special social convention that
signifies moral condemnation") with Sloane, supra note 22, at 71 ("By punishing the perpetrators of
serious international crimes . . . the international community attempts authoritatively to disavow the
conduct, to indicate symbolically its refusal to acquiesce in the crimes.").
34. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 6 (creating ICTY); S.C. Res. 935, supra note 6 (creating
ICTR).
35. See List of State Parties, INT'L CRIM. CoURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en menus/asp/states%
20parties/ Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Feb. 18,
2014).
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international community,3 6 whereas domestic criminal courts represent the
community of a state's citizens.37 Defendants at ICTs also stand trial for
violating "global stability" and "global humanity" as opposed to domestic
38
values and norms.
Of course, many ICT defendants will have allegedly violated both
domestic and international legal norms. Across legal cultures, there is a
great deal of overlap in the concepts of right and wrong. 39 But
notwithstanding this overlap, a particular defendant may have transgressed
against the international community but not his or her national
community. 40 An ICT defendant's conduct can constitute a threat to global
stability and global humanity but appear entirely justifiable or even
laudatory to his or her own community.41
Some scholars, perhaps wary that ICTs can effectively speak on behalf
of an abstract international community, have suggested that ICTs should
seek to act as proxies of national communities.42 Support for such a view
can be found in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which require judges
to consider national penalties in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda when
sentencing defendants.43  Moreover, pursuant to the principle of
complementarity, the ICC can assert jurisdiction only when national
44authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute certain crimes.
Adherence to this principle may suggest that the ICC and future ICTs
36. The ICC explicitly claims to speak on behalf of the international community. See, e.g., ICC
Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. & art. 5(1). The ICTY and ICTR represent the international community
because they were created by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See
Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5
CRIM. L.F. 237, 237 (1994) ("One may call it truly amazing that the international community, acting
through the Security Council, has been able to set up two international criminal jurisdictions in the
recent past.").
37. Sloane, supra note 22, at 48.
38. Id. at 54 (citing MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING AGAINST WAR 74
(2004)).
39. See generally Woods, supra note 32, at 648-50 (summarizing the sociological research of
prominent punishment naturalists).
40. Id. at 655.
41. See id. at 651-52 (discussing Sierra Leoneans' views concerning Special Court of Sierra
Leone defendant Issa Sesay).
42. See, e.g., Steven Glickman, Victim's Justice: Legitimizing the Sentencing Regime of the
International Criminal Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 229, 257 (2004); Adam M. Smith, Book
Note, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 563, 570 (2004) (reviewing FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (P. Sands ed., 2003)); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2005) (suggesting that the ICC
should defer to local jurisprudential norms).
43. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 23(1). The ICC
Statute contains no such reference to national practices. Sloane, supra note 22, at 43.
44. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 17(1)(a).
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should strive to act on behalf of national communities that have been
denied the opportunity to mete out justice themselves.
Although the ICC and other ICTs should certainly take into account the
views and concerns of national communities, they were never intended to
simulate national judicial mechanisms and should not seek to do so in any
case.45 The ICTR and ICTY prosecute international law violations in
Tanzania and the Netherlands respectively-countries far removed from
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.46 While the ICTR and ICTY statutes
reference domestic sentencing practice, ICTR and ICTY judges have not
been bound by the penal practices of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.4
Indeed, the disconnect between these ICTs and the people of Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia has been so great that the international community
created so-called "hybrid" tribunals to address war crimes committed in
other regions.48
For the ICC to seek to represent national communities would be
particularly problematic because it has jurisdiction over cases involving
"the most serious crimes of international concern,"4 9 and, under the
principle of complementarity, the ICC may assert jurisdiction over these
crimes only if national authorities are either unable or unwilling to
prosecute them domestically.50 The fact that the ICC need not defer to
domestic justice when domestic justice is ineffectual reflects the
45. See Sloane, supra note 22, at 52 ("The drafters of the Rome Statute did not design the Court
with a view to the satisfaction of local penal interests.").
46. See S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995) (establishing Tanzania as the seat
of the ICTR); S.C. Res. 827, 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the Netherlands
as the seat of the ICTY).
47. Sloane, supra note 22, at 49. The ICC Statute does not reference domestic practices. See id.
48. See, e.g., John Cerone, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and Role of the International
Criminal Court By Using Transitional and Restorative Justice Mechanisms, 6 INTERDISC. J. HUM.
RTs. L. 83, 91 (2012); Fr6d6ric M6gret, Beyond "Fairness": Understanding the Detriments of
International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 47 (2009). Whether
hybrid tribunals such as the SCSL are better able to act as proxies of national communities is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, although hybrid tribunals are structured so as to better
accommodate the views of national communities, scholars have expressed skepticism that they are
truly reflective of the domestic will. See TIMOTHY KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION:
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 256 (2009) (criticizing the
SCSL for delivering sentences that do not accord with national sentiments); see also Phuong Pham et
al., After the First Trial: APopulation-Based Survey on Knowledge and Perception of Justice and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 3 (Oct. 1, 2011) (Human Rights Center,
University of California Berkeley), http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0n22238c (suggesting that
Cambodians would rather the country focus on economic problems than address crimes committed by
the Khmer Rouge regime via the country's hybrid tribunal).
49. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 1, 17(1)(a).
50. See id. art. 17(1)(a).
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international community's longstanding skepticism that every state can be
trusted to redress serious international crimes.
A crucial and often overlooked antecedent to the Nuremberg Tribunal
was Germany's failure to prosecute those responsible for World War I.51
Germany tried twelve individuals before the country's Supreme Court at
Leipzig, and only six were convicted with sentences ranging from six
months' to four years' imprisonment. Based on this experience, the
Allies were determined to not defer to national justice at Nuremberg.53 The
ICTR and ICTY followed this precedent by asserting primacy over
national trials in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.5
The ICC is designed to work in tandem with domestic criminal courts
to punish serious international crimes, 5 but the complementarity principle
also incentivizes each state to demonstrate to the international community
that it can abide by its duty to "exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for serious international crimes." 56 If a state cannot fulfill its
duties, then the ICC is able to assume jurisdiction. To suggest that the ICC
should dispense justice according to local sentiments disincentivizes states
to meet their obligations to the international community.
Another significant difference between ICTs such as the ICC and
domestic criminal courts is that the former generally have goals that the
latter do not.5 As one commentator has observed:
Beside standard objectives of national criminal law enforcement,
such as retribution for wrongdoing, general deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, international criminal courts
51. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International
Criminal law, 15 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 321, 332-33 (1999).
52. Id. at 332.
53. Id.at333.
54. ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2); ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 9(2).
55. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. (noting that the effective prosecution of
international crimes "must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation"); Turner, supra note 42, at 2 (suggesting that the ICC should engage with
national prosecutors and judges to ensure the enforcement of international norms in post-conflict
societies).
56. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.; see also ICC, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Doc. ICC-OTP 2003 (Sept. 2003), at 5, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy Paper.pdf ("[Tihe principle underlying the concept of
complementarity is that States remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting
crimes committed under their jurisdiction and that national systems are expected to maintain and
enforce adherence to international standards.").
57. See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 22, at 55; Turner, supra note 42, at 66; see also Milan Markovic,
The ICC Prosecutor's Missing Code of Conduct, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 201, 210 (2011) (suggesting that
ICC trials can and should have educative effects).
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profess to pursue numerous additional aims .... At various times,
the courts have expressed their intention to produce a reliable
historical record of the context of international crime, to provide a
venue for giving voice to international crime's many victims, and to
propagate human rights values. Courts have also expressed their
aspiration to make advances in international criminal law, and to
achieve objectives related to peace and security-such as stopping
an ongoing conflict-that are far removed from the normal concerns
of national criminal justice.s
Domestic criminal trials may occasionally implicate these goals. Some
domestic trials can have a bearing on domestic (and even international)
peace and security, and such trials may also create important records of
significant historical events. 59 However, because international criminal
trials involve "the most serious crimes of international concem," 60 their
importance and meaning will almost always transcend whether one
particular individual should be punished for certain acts that he or she
allegedly committed.61 Although the ICC and future ICTs might benefit
from less ambitious agendas, 62 this ambition arguably reflects that more is
expected of international criminal trials.
Judges at the ICC and future ICTs will obviously play a central role in
ensuring that their institutions represent international norms and values
and achieve the distinct goals of international criminal law. Nevertheless,
there has been little analysis as to whether these judges' national
allegiances might interfere with their ability to as act impartial
representatives of the international community and its values. 63 The next
58. Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.- KENT L. REV.
329, 331 (2008).
59. Scholars have generally been skeptical that international criminal trials can create such a
record. See, e.g., id. at 338; Woods, supra note 32, at 657 ("The use of retributive criminal trials to
establish a historical record for grave crimes has been widely criticized."); see also Allison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 95 (2005)
(claiming that courts cannot create a historical narrative and still address the individuation of guilt).
But see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Iaw and Politics in International Criminal
Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 540 (2008) (noting that constructing a historical narrative has been
central to the mission of ICTs since Nuremberg).
60. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
61. See Turner, supra note 42, at 536.
62. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (2007);
Damaska, supra note 58, at 331 ("Unlike Atlas, international criminal courts are not bodies of titanic
strength, capable of carrying on their shoulders the burden of so many tasks.").
63. See generally Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 42-44 (distinguishing view that ICTs
should dispense impartial justice from the view that judges should only be granted considerable
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Part contends that judges at the ICC and future ICTs should be
disqualified from adjudicating cases substantially involving crimes
allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals but need not be
excluded from other cases.
II. NATIONAL BIAS AND ICT JUDGES
The international community consists of nations that are politically,
culturally, and legally diverse. There is a growing sense that the ICC and
other ICTs should reflect this diversity.64 For example, the state parties to
the ICC are required to take into account the following in electing judges:
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the
world;
(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and
(iii) A fair representation of female and male judges.65
The ICC's effort to establish a diverse judiciary ensures not only that the
court will better reflect the international community than its
predecessors,66 but may also help to legitimize the ICC's actions.6
A necessary corollary to the question of who should serve on the ICC
and other ICTs is the question of whether there are any circumstances in
which the service of certain judges would be incompatible with the
mandate to speak to the "shared values of humanity and shared interests of
states."68 The ICC Statute provides a partial answer by stipulating that
judges who are nationals of the same state cannot simultaneously serve on
the court.69 However, while the ICC Statute appears to recognize the value
of national diversity, it fails to appreciate that judges might be influenced
by national allegiances in the performance of their duties.
Although any number of personal characteristics could theoretically
have a bearing on a judge's decision-making, national identity is a
agency on those issues that are of little concern to the great powers).
64. See, e.g., Jessica Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal
Proceedings, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 745, 746-47 (2006); see also Turner, supra note 42, at 23.
65. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(8)(a).
66. Analysis of data on judicial appointments at the ICTY and ICTR suggests that the ICTY has
been dominated by Western judges and the ICTR by African judges, with judges from Latin American
countries underrepresented on both courts. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49. Judges from civil
law countries are also underrepresented. Id. at 21.
67. See Turner, supra note 42, at 23; Markovic, supra note 57, at 208.
68. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53.
69. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(7).
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particularly powerful source of affiliation. The prominent sociologist
Anthony Smith has claimed that no "serious rival to the nation ... exists
for the affections and loyalties of most human beings." 70 Even ardent
critics of the concept of "a nation" acknowledge its psychological
importance.
The ICC and other ICTs should be particularly concerned about
national bias in judging because a system predicated on international
norms and values should be supported by individuals who are guided
primarily by the "shared values of humanity and shared interests of
states."72 If the ICC and future ICTs apportion criminal responsibility for a
particular conflict pursuant to the perspective of one party to that conflict,
they risk compromising their role as neutral representatives of the
international community. The recourse to international criminal justice
also indicates that national justice mechanisms have proven inadequate
and legitimizes the exclusion of domestic norms and values as valid bases
for decision-making.
The remainder of this Part will substantiate the claim that national bias
is likely to affect the adjudication of international criminal trials. Unlike
ICTs, most other international tribunals recognize that national bias exists
and seek to account for it. Empirical data from the International Court of
Justice ('IC") and the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") also
suggests that judges consistently rule in favor of their home nations while
not being guided by geopolitical concerns more generally. This is
consistent with this Article's contention that judges at the ICC and other
ICTs should be excluded from only those cases involving crimes allegedly
committed by or against their fellow nationals. The Part then suggests that
national bias is especially likely to affect judging at the ICC and other
ICTs on account of the following: (1) the psychological manifestations of
the conflicts with which international criminal trials are concerned; (2) the
motivations of judges; and (3) the nature of fact-finding and legal analysis
with respect to international criminal trials.
70. A.D. SMITH, NATIONALISM AND MODERNISM: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF RECENT THEORIES OF
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 195 (1998); see also Harold Chapman Brown, Social Psychology and the
Problem of a Higher Nationalism, 28 INT'L J. ETHICS 19, 19 (1917) ("Many humanitarians seem to
believe that the boundaries of the nations might be swept away and a federation of all mankind
substituted without loss. But the psychologist can hardly concur in this opinion.").
71. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (1991) ("[M]embers of even the
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.").
72. Sloane, supra note 22, at 53.
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A Practice and Evidence from Other International Tribunals
In contrast to ICTs, many other international tribunals recognize that a
judge's nationality is likely to have a bearing on his or her decision-
making and employ measures to counteract this phenomenon.73 The ICJ
Statute provides that when one of the ICJ's judges shares the nationality of
one of the parties, the other party is entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge to
hear the case. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea follows
the same practice. The ECHR also permits a state to appoint an ad hoc
judge if it lacks a judge on the chamber hearing a complaint against it
while not allowing a judge to sit as a single judge with respect to
complaints made against his or her state.76 The Inter-American Court for
Human Rights ("IACHR") and the African Court on Human and People's
Rights ("ACHPR") mandate that judges recuse themselves from cases
involving their home states.
Other prominent international bodies also account for national bias. To
"promote impartiality in appearance as well as in substance," members of
the Human Rights Committee do not consider either periodic reports filed
by their own states or complaints filed against their states.7' The
Committee Against Torture similarly prohibits its members from
examining complaints initiated against their states.
One prominent exception is the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"),
which does not allow nationality-based challenges to the composition of
any chamber.o Given its role as a quasi-constitutional court for Europe,"
it is understandable that the ECJ would seek to dismiss the notion that a
73. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 78.
74. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
75. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex XI art. 17(2), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 39.
76. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 98 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No. 14 Amending the Control System of the Convention, May
13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194). Although states are not required to only nominate candidates of their own
nationality to sit on the ECHR, that is the usual outcome. See id.
77. Id. at 92, 97.
78. See Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, The
Human Rights Committee, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) 13 (May 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/FactSheetl5rev. len.pdf.
79. Rules of Procedure for the Committee Against Torture, Rule 109(c), U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/3/Rev.5 (Feb. 2011).
80. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 100.
81. Geoffrey Garret et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149, 149 (1998) ("The [ECJ] interprets EU treaties
as if they represent a de facto constitution for Europe.").
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judge's nationality has any bearing on the adjudicative process.
Furthermore, to ensure that the decision-making of individual judges is
shielded from scrutiny, the ECJ "organizes its work with a degree of
opacity that rivals that of the secret sessions of England's Fifteenth
Century Star Chamber."82 The ECJ issues opinions only by consensus, and
prohibits dissenting opinions.83 The means by which judges are assigned
to a particular chamber is also a mystery.84 Such opacity would be
unacceptable at the ICC, where judges hear cases in the open, issue signed
opinions, and can be held responsible for their rulings.
The World Trade Organization's Appellate Body ("WTO AB") is
another exception. The WTO AB does not require recusal when one of its
members shares the nationality of a party before the tribunal, 5 and
members are assigned to a particular division "regardless of their national
origin."86 Interestingly, the panels from which the WTO AB hears appeals
do require their members to recuse themselves from cases involving their
home nations.8  This dichotomy may simply reflect the limited jurisdiction
of the WTO AB" and that its members are required to be technocrats who
are unaffiliated with any particular government.89 ICT judges conversely
have far more adjudicative discretion 90 and are selected largely on the
basis of nationality. 91
All of the international tribunals that do explicitly account for national
bias, either by requiring the recusal of judges as with the IACHR and
ACHPR, or the appointment of ad hoc judges as with the ICJ and ECHR,
address (often controversial) claims of state misconduct. The ICC and
82. R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European
Union (Rutgers University Working Paper, Feb. 23, 2011) at 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=1914516.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 103-04.
86. Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, art. 6(2), WT/ABIWP/6 (Aug.
16, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/ab e.htm.
87. Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 103.
88. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 17(6), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsu-e.htm ("An appeal shall
be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel.").
89. Id. Annex 2, art. 17(3) ("The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized authority,
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered
agreements generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government.").
90. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 248.
91. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 36(7)-(8); see also Erik Voeten, The Politics of
International Judicial Appointments, 9 CI. J. INT'L L. 387, 402 (2009) (noting that nationality is the
most significant factor in determining whether a judicial candidate is elected to an ICT).
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other ICTs consider claims against individuals, however, which might
suggest that nations' interests are not as implicated in international
criminal trials, obviating the need to control for national bias.
It is true that ICTs such as the ICC do not directly consider claims
against states.92 The ICC Statute specifically provides that "[n]o provision
in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law."93 Nevertheless, claims
can still be brought against states based on individuals' violations of
international criminal law. In the Bosnia Genocide case, for example,
Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to hold Serbia responsible for genocide
based on the actions of Bosnian forces in Srebrenica and other regions of
Bosnia. 94 The ICJ ultimately dismissed most of the claims against Serbia
but in so doing relied almost entirely on the ICTY's findings with respect
to the Bosnian conflict.95 Consequently, while the ICC does not consider
claims against states, ICC judgments could form the basis of subsequent
actions against states in other forums. 96
Moreover, notwithstanding that a crime may be of concern to the
"international community as a whole,"9  it will almost always be of
greatest concern to one or more states. The ICC's first defendant, rebel
leader Thomas Lubanga, has been described as a "small fish," 98 but the
ICC found that Mr. Lubanga committed serious crimes in connection with
the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC").99 An
acquittal would have been damaging to the DRC government and may
92. It is possible, however, that a state might be entitled to the "specific proceeds, property or
assets which have been derived directly or indirectly from the crime." See ICC, International Criminal
Court Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 147, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1EOAC1C-
A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B1 15E886/140164/Rules of procedure and Evidence English.pdf.
93. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 25(4).
94. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 64 (Feb. 26).
95. See id. 214.
96. This would include not only international tribunals such as the ICJ and ECHR but domestic
courts as well.
97. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
98. See, e.g., David Smith, Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Convicted of Using Child Soldiers,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/14/congo-thomas-lubanga-
child-soldiers; see also Andrew Harding, Meeting Lubanga, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17368072 (noting perception of Lubanga as a "small fish").
99. Lubanga was convicted of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen and
using them to participate actively in hostilities in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from early September 2002 to August 13, 2003. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of Statute, 1 (July 12, 2012).
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have fomented instability in the country.100 Virtually every case before the
ICC will involve a defendant who is alleged to have committed violations
of international law against, or on behalf of, one or more states. These
states will have a vested interest in the conviction or acquittal of that
defendant.
Data from the ICJ and ECHR suggests that international tribunals'
concerns about national bias in judging are well-founded. In a 2005 article,
Posner and de Figueiredo examined the voting of ICJ judges who
participated in the seventy-six cases that reached a substantive decision.101
The authors hypothesized that, inter alia, judges would tend to vote in
favor of their home states as well as countries that resembled their own in
terms of region, wealth, and political structure. 102
Posner and de Figueiredo found clear evidence that ICJ judges exhibit
bias in favor of their home states. Ad hoc judges voted 90.5% in favor of
their home states when the home state was an applicant and 90.2% of the
time when the home state was a respondent.103 While these results could
be explained by the fact that ad hoc judges might conceive of themselves
as advocates for their nations, the ICJ's permanent judges voted similarly.
Permanent judges voted in favor of their home states 83.3% of the time
when the home state was an applicant and 89.5% of the time when the
home state was the respondent. 104 In all, ICJ judges ruled in favor of their
home states nearly 90% of the time.105 Posner and de Figueiredo also
found some evidence for their hypothesis that ICJ judges vote for states
that resemble their own in terms of wealth and political structure, 106 but
did not find that judges were influenced by regional and military
alignments. 107
Similarly, Erik Voeten analyzed the dissents of ECHR judges in 1,024
Level 1 judgments to determine the bearing of a judge's nationality and
100. When the Lubanga Trial was previously suspended, observers warned of instability in the
Ituri region where Lubanga remains quite popular. See DRC: ICC Suspension a Risk for Ituri Stability,
IRIN AFRICA (June 24, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspxReportId=78820 (quoting a
human rights lawyer in Kinshasa).
101. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 604-05.
102. See id. at 609.
103. Id. at 615. A similar study by Adam M. Smith found that judges voted with their states 80%
of the time. See Adam M. Smith, Judicial Nationalism in International Iaw: National Identity and
Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 197, 218 (2005).
104. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 615; see also Smith, supra note 103, at 218
(finding that permanent judges voted with their home states 70% of the time).
105. Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 19, at 615.
106. See id. at 617.
107. See, e.g., id. at 622.
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other factors on the ECHR's decision-making.0 He found that when a
ruling favored the respondent state, 100% of ad hoc judges and 95% of
permanent judges from the respondent country voted with the majority.1 09
When a ruling went against the respondent state, 33% of ad hoc judges
and 16% of permanent judges from the respondent state dissented
compared to only 8% of the other judges.110 These findings were
statistically significant and led Voeten to conclude that ECHR judges fail
to be impartial when evaluating the conduct of their own national
governments.1
Voeten also found that national bias is particularly prevalent in cases
involving article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture
and inhumane treatment.112 In such cases, judges were 25% more likely to
vote in favor of their national governments than in other cases.113 Voeten
attributes this phenomenon to the political sensitivity of these cases and
their potential bearing on national security.1 14 There was no evidence,
however, that other factors such as legal culture or geopolitics impacted
the decision-making of ECHR judges.115
Lastly, in a 2005 study, Meernik, King, and Dancy analyzed the
sentencing practices of the ICTY Trial Chamber.11 6 Although ICTY
defendants do not share the nationalities of the ICTY's judges, the study is
nevertheless useful for its examination of whether national bias might lead
judges to take into account their nations' foreign policy interests. The
authors hypothesized that judges from certain NATO countries sentenced
Serbian defendants more harshly than did other judges. 11 They found no
significant differences in sentencing, however, and concluded more
generally that "the characteristics of the nation and political system from
which ICTY judges come do not predict the severity of the punishment in
the manner expected." 1
108. Voeten, supra note 19, at 425. Level 1 judgments are those that the ECHR itself deems as
most legally significant. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 425-26.
112. Id. at 427-28.
113. Id. at 428.
114. Id. at 430.
115. Id. at 431.
116. James Meernik et al., Judicial Decision Maldng and International Tribunals: Assessing the
Impact of Individual, National, and International Factors, 86 Soc. SCI. Q. 683, 695 (2005).
117. Id. at 690. Unfortunately, Meernik et al. focus only on the decision-making of judges from
the United States, France, and Great Britain, and do not consider the decision -making of judges from
other NATO countries such as Germany. Id.
118. Id.at698.
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Taken together, the results from the ICJ and ECHR clearly suggest that
national bias impacts decision-making when a judge is asked to adjudicate
the conduct (or misconduct) of his or her nation. Data from the ICJ,
ECHR, and ICTY does not indicate, however, that national bias leads
judges to vote according to their nations' geopolitical interests. These
findings are consistent with this Article's proposal that judges should be
disqualified from cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or
against their nationals but not necessarily other cases.
Of course, none of the above studies specifically addresses whether an
ICT judge is likely to rule on the basis of domestic norms and interests in a
case involving crimes allegedly committed by or against his or her
nationals. Moreover, there are obvious limitations to the utility of findings
from other tribunals. The next section sets out the reasons why national
bias is particularly likely to affect judges at the ICC and other ICTs.
B. National Bias in the Adjudication of International Criminal Trials
Although data from international tribunals such as the ICJ and ECHR
suggests that a judge's nationality impacts his or her decision-making in
cases pertaining to his or her home nation, national bias may not
necessarily have a discernible impact on international criminal trials. The
ICJ considers claims by states against other states and has been described
as a product of "a Westphalian world in which states were the only
legitimate transnational actors, and nationality, in turn, was a prime aspect
of individual definition."119 The ECHR and ICTs both address human
rights violations committed against individuals, but the interests of states
could be more directly implicated in ECHR proceedings, given that states
are the respondents, than they are in international criminal trials. 120
This Part will explain why ICT judges are especially likely to exhibit
national bias. International criminal trials will usually address "intractable
conflicts" that are characterized as "protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of a
zero-sum nature, total, and central, with the parties involved having an
interest in their continuation . . . [as well as being] costly both in human
and material terms."121 Judges cannot be expected to psychologically
separate themselves from their national polities when assigning
responsibility for crimes committed in intractable conflicts involving their
119. Smith, supra note 103, at 222.
120. But see discussion supra Part II.A.
121. Daniel Bar-Tal, From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation:
Psychological Analysis, 21 POL. PSYCH. 351, 353 (2000).
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home nations. States are also able to nominate judges to the ICC and other
ICTs who share their perspectives, and these judges will have strong
incentives to rule in accordance with their states' interests. This creates the
potential for actual bias as well as the reasonable apprehension of bias on
the part of a conflict's participants. Lastly, ICT judges also possess a great
deal of adjudicative discretion and are able to consciously or
unconsciously give effect to their national biases.
1. Psychological Manifestations of Intractable Conflicts
International criminal trials involve horrific crimes committed against
the citizens of one or more nations. The ICC Statute describes such crimes
as "unimaginable" and "shocking [to the] conscience of humanity."122
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs will inevitably be outraged by many of
the acts that defendants appearing before them are alleged to have
committed. 123 The source of this outrage will differ, however, depending
on whether the crimes in question were committed against the judge's
home nation. When a case does not involve a judge's home nation, the
judge will react as a member of the international community to the
defendant's alleged assault upon global stability and global humanity. 12 4
When a case does involve the judge's home nation, the judge will
primarily react as a member of his or her national community to the
defendant's alleged assault upon that particular community. A judge will
also be inclined to react more as a member of his or her national
community when the judge shares the nationality of the defendant, and the
defendant allegedly committed war crimes in the context of defending
their shared state from a significant internal or external threat.
A terrible crime, particularly if it is political in nature, might inspire
feelings of nationalist outrage among judges in domestic courts as well.
However, a domestic proceeding with full procedural safeguards is not
made illegitimate if the judge views the crimes from the perspective of his
or her fellow nationals. Indeed, domestic judges are representatives of
their national communities and are expected to embody their communities'
"shared valuations."12 5 In most cases, a judge's view of the events at issue
122. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.
123. See Woods, supra note 32, at 662-63.
124. Sloane, supra note 22, at 54 (citing MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING
AGAINST WAR 74 (2004)).
125. See J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29
CARDozo L. REv. 669, 692-93 (2007) ("Adjudication is particularly laden with moral significance in
criminal cases. Each time a judge sentences an offender to prison, or condemns an individual to death,
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will not be out of step with his or her fellow citizens. 126
Conversely, to represent "the international community as a whole" in a
tribunal such as the ICC,127 judges must be able to separate themselves
from their national polities and look beyond merely domestic interests and
norms. To the extent that international criminal trials involve intractable
conflicts, however, such separation will be exceedingly difficult:
During [an] intractable conflict, the socio-psychological
infrastructure helps the society members to satisfy their basic needs
to cope with stress and to successfully withstand the enemy. But at
the same time, this infrastructure becomes a prism through which
society members construe their reality, collect new information,
interpret their experiences, and then make decisions....
[I]nvolvement in intractable conflicts tends to "close minds" and
stimulate tunnel vision, which excludes incongruent information
and alternative approaches to the conflict.128
The ICC, in light of its mandate to consider the "most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole" 129 can be expected to
predominately have jurisdiction over intractable conflicts, as opposed to
low-intensity conflicts of relatively short duration.13 0
Psychological studies involving intractable conflicts reveal the degree
to which intractable conflicts cause dramatic distortions in the
it should be a solemn, transformative ritual. The judge, representing the public, banishes the
transgressor from civic society."); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 351 (1997) (claiming that the criminal law's purpose is to reflect
"shared valuations").
126. This argument would have less force for societies that are deeply divided and where the
judiciary is composed of only a small cross-section of society because judges would have less of a
claim to speak for the society as a whole. Cf. Daniel Levin, Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent,
the Heritage Movement, and Democratic Theory, 29 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 105, 107 (2004) ("Without a
clear consensus [on values], judges must impose a particular set of values that may not reflect the
larger public will and may be more representative of certain cultural or legal elites.").
127. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
128. Daniel Bar-Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts, 50 AM. BEHAv.
SCIENTIST 1430, 1446-47 (2007).
129. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
130. The ICC's Kenya prosecutions are possible exceptions. See In re The Situation of the
Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 8-10 (Mar. 31, 2010)
(Kaul, J., dissenting) (suggesting that crimes committed within the Republic of Kenya were "common
crimes," outside of the jurisdiction of the ICC). Even in such cases, however, the influence of their
appointing nation may shape the judges' ability to view the case. See infra Part II.B.2; cf. Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal. Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) ("[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case.").
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participants' ability to process information related to these conflicts.13 For
example, in one prominent study, psychologists provided Israeli Jews and
Israeli Arabs with copies of Israeli and Palestinian interim peace proposals
that had originally been distributed during bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks in Washington, D.C. in May 1993.132 The study's participants
were asked to rate how favorable the proposals were to Israelis and
Palestinians, with only half of the participants receiving correct
information as to which side had authored the proposal.133
Not surprisingly, putative authorship significantly affected both
groups' perceptions of the proposals. 13 4 Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs
believed that the Palestinian proposal was more favorable to Israelis and
less favorable to Palestinians when they believed that it was an Israeli
proposal than when the proposal was correctly identified as a Palestinian
one.135 More striking is that the actual contents of the proposal had less of
an effect on the participants' perceptions of the proposal than putative
authorship. 136 Israeli Jews generally responded more negatively to an
Israeli proposal when they believed it to be a Palestinian proposal than
they did to the actual Palestinian proposal when it was attributed to
Israel. 137
In another study, also involving Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs,
experimenters provided test subjects with three short vignettes involving a
shooting. 138 The vignettes either involved Israeli Jews travelling by car
through an Arab-dominated town or Israeli Arabs travelling by car through
a Jewish-dominated town.139 The subjects were told that the passengers
faced the following threats before they fired guns from the car: (1) a
demonstration of shouting women and children who did not threaten
physical harm to the passengers; (2) a demonstration with stones thrown at
the vehicle; and (3) a demonstration in which firearms were used against
131. See, e.g., Daniel Bar-Tal et al., The Influence of the Ethos of Conflict on Israeli Jews'
Interpretation of Jewish-Palestinian Encounters, 53 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 94 (2009); Ifat Maoz et al.,
Reactive Devaluation of an "Israeli" v. "Palestinian" Peace Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515
(2002).
132. Maoz el al., supra note 131, at 528.
133. Id. at 529.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 532.
137. Id.
138. See Yohanan Eshel & Michael Moran, Jewish-Arab Violence: Perspectives of a Dominant
Majority and a Subordinate Minority, 142 J. Soc. PSYCH. 549 (2002).
139. Id. at 553.
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the vehicle. 140 Subjects were then asked to rate the justifiability of the
shootings and explain why the shootings were (or were not) justified. 141
According to the study's findings, both Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs
justified shootings by members of their own groups more readily than
shootings committed by members of the other group, notwithstanding that
all of the shooters faced the same basic threats. 142 Jewish and Arab
participants also tended to offer different justifications for the shootings.
Jewish participants predominately focused on the danger to the shooters
and more often cited self-defense as a justification whereas Arab
participants concentrated primarily on the motives of the shooters and
demonstrators as well as the history of Jewish-Arab conflict. 143 The
authors concluded that "in-group bias in judging intergroup violence
should be expected when it is associated with issues of self- and national
identity or with the image of the opposite group."144
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an especially intractable conflict, and
it would be far too crude to assume that judges at the ICC and other ICTs
will discredit information provided by "enemy" witnesses and overvalue
information provided by their compatriots. Nor will judges necessarily
reject defenses offered by "enemy" defendants that they would accept
from other defendants. However, judges are presumably not immune to
the same psychological pressures that affect their fellow nationals in an
intractable conflict. They cannot just focus on the evidence before them as
disinterested members of the international community because evidence
will be analyzed through the prism of membership in a national polity
locked in an intractable conflict.
It may be objected that judges, unlike laypeople, are required to be
impartial. It is dubious, however, that judges' conscious efforts to maintain
impartiality while serving on the ICC or another ICT can negate what are
largely unconscious processes. Indeed, according to some studies,
140. Id. at 554-55.
141. Id. at 555.
142. Id. at 561.
143. Id. at 562.
144. Id. at 561-62 (internal citations omitted).
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exhortations and directives to individuals to "be objective" actually
exacerbate cognitive biases.145 As Dan Kahan has observed:
[O]bjectivity injunctions accentuate identity threat. Individuals
naturally assume that beliefs they share with others in their defining
group are "objective." Accordingly, those are the beliefs they are
most likely to see as correct when prompted to be "rational" and
"open-minded." Indeed, for them to change their minds in such a
circumstance would require them to discern irrationality or bias
within their group, an inference fraught with dissonance .... 146
Even if judges are assumed to be less susceptible to cognitive dissonance
than their fellow nationals, an international trial involving horrific crimes
allegedly committed by or against members of a judge's national polity is
an unlikely venue for professional detachment to triumph over the natural
tendency to view a conflict and the crimes committed therein through the
prism of national identity.
Of course, the idea that judges will be unconsciously motivated by
national bias presupposes that a judge will identify with his or her national
community and does not adequately account for the rich national
backgrounds of many prominent international judges.147 Nevertheless, the
mere fact that a judge may be a citizen of more than one state is unlikely to
insulate the judge from the psychological phenomena addressed in this
section. 14 Immigrants can presumably integrate into their new societies
and may be able to form as strong national allegiances as their native-born
compatriots.149 Even if a judge may have been a part of a different national
polity at one time, he or she may still assess an intractable conflict
involving his or her current home nation through the prism of domestic
145. See Dan Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for
Constitutional Iaw, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (citing Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Bridging the
Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in
Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 415 (2007)).
146. Id.
147. The former President of the ICTY, Theodor Meron, for example, was born in Poland,
immigrated to Israel, where he served in the country's foreign service, and moved to the United States
in 1978. See Biographical Note: President Theodor Meron, ICTY (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.icty.org/
x/file/About/Chambers/pdt meron bio news 1mar2012_en.pdf. He became a U.S. citizen in 1984. Id.
See also Smith, supra note 103, at 223 (reviewing backgrounds of ICJ judges).
148. The ICC Statute suggests that citizenship should be determined by where a judge primarily
exercises his or her civil rights. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(7).
149. A full account of the mechanics of national integration is beyond the scope of this article.
For an early analysis of the integration of immigrants and minority groups in United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, see ANTHONY H. BIRCH, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION 3
(1989).
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norms and values. Furthermore, as set out in the following Part, the nature
of the nomination process at ICTs, like the ICC, by and large assures that
judges will be attuned to the national self-interest.
2. Judges and Motivated Reasoning
Judges at the ICTY and ICTR serve four-year terms and are then
eligible for reelection. 5 0 ICC judges, by way of contrast, generally serve
nine-year terms and are ineligible for reelection. 51 However, regardless of
whether a judge must stand for reelection, it will be in his or her self-
interest to avoid alienating his or her home state. This Part will focus on
the likely motivations of ICC judges, but the argument will apply equally
to other ICTs, as long as states control the nomination process and largely
determine judges' careers.
The ICC Statute allows for a judge to be removed upon a
recommendation by a two-thirds majority of the ICC's judges and then a
two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly of State Parties.152
Consequently, absent egregious misconduct, ICC judges are likely to serve
the entirety of their terms. 153 This provides a degree of protection from
political pressure and allows them to make unpopular decisions.
Although ICC judges are not eligible for reelection and cannot easily
be removed, they are still very likely to be concerned with how their
judgments are perceived. Judges, whether they serve on domestic or
international courts, are motivated to maintain and improve their
standing. 154 ICC judges will undoubtedly wish to be well-regarded by the
international community, but of equal or greater concern will be how they
are regarded by their own states. Most judges will wish to at least have
the opportunity to return to employment in their own countries after the
150. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 13(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 12(3).
151. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 36(9)(a). A judge can theoretically serve a longer term,
however, if he or she is elected to complete another judge's term and less than three years is remaining
on that term. See id. art. 37(2).
152. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 46(2)(a).
153. See id. art. 46(1) (setting out grounds for removal of ICC judges).
154. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 3, at 929 (suggesting that, in the context of international
criminal law, "the judge, practitioner, or scholar who espouses conviction-friendly interpretations can
reliably expect to be applauded as progressive and compassionate by esteem-granting communities");
Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68
CINCINNATI L. REV. 615, 629-30 (2000) (suggesting that justices of the United States Supreme Court
are motivated to rule in ways that are in substantive accordance with legal elites); Richard Posner,
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?, 3 SUP. CT. L. ECON. REv. 1, 15 (1993) (suggesting that for
the extraordinary judge, such as the justices of the Supreme Court, reputation may be a "dominating
objective").
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conclusion of their nine-year terms. Some may also wish to secure
appointments with other international tribunals, and "international judicial
careers depend heavily on government recommendations." 55 To the extent
that an ICC judge is concerned with his or her post-ICC career, the judge
will have to carefully strike a balance between fulfilling his or her duties
and not alienating his or her home government.
Of course, the outcomes of most ICC cases will be of relatively little
interest to a judge's home state.156 Moreover, even if a judge were to issue
a decision that is arguably at odds with the foreign policy of his or her
home state, the state may not take any action against the judge. ICC judges
are required to be independent and impartial,s15  and respect for judicial
impartiality and independence requires that states support judges'
decisions even when they might disagree with them.s15 By allowing ICC
judges to carry out their duties free from political interference, states also
signal to the international community that they are credibly committed to
international justice and are uninterested in victor's justice. 159
However, the focus of this Article is not on cases that only tangentially
concern a judge's home state, but rather those involving crimes allegedly
committed by or against a judge's fellow nationals and other cases that
strongly implicate the national self-interest. Such cases are bound to attract
attention in the judge's home state and are likely to impact political
conditions therein. A judge will be able to readily surmise whether it is in
his or her self-interest to convict the defendants without interference from
his or her state.
Judges need not even consciously consider their personal interests for
these interests to affect their decision-making on account of the
psychological phenomenon of motivated reasoning:
Motivated reasoning refers to the tendency of people to
unconsciously process information-including empirical data, oral
and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory
155. Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 421, 442 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack eds., 2013).
156. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 44 ("Judges may have considerable agency on those
issues that are of little concern to the great powers.").
157. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 40(1).
158. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Iaw Among Nations, 31 A.B.A. J. 290, 294 (1945) ("It is
futile to think that we can have international courts that will always render the decisions we want to
promote our interests. We cannot successfully cooperate with the rest of the world in establishing a
reign of law unless we are prepared to have that law sometimes operate against what would be our
national advantage.").
159. See Voeten, supra note 91, at 392; Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 42.
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perceptions-to promote goals or interests extrinsic to the decision-
making task at hand. When subject to it, individuals can be
unwittingly disabled from making dispassionate, open-minded, and
fair judgments. 160
There is a growing literature assessing the impact of motivated reasoning
on judging in a variety of legal fields.1 61 The implication for the ICC is
that judges may honestly wish to rule impartially in cases substantially
involving their home states, but they will be motivated to take into account
domestic political concerns and interests so as to not jeopardize their
careers.162 A judge does not even have to feel strong ties to his or her
national polity to be highly motivated to analyze a case involving his or
her home nation in accordance with the national self-interest.
Not all ICC judges will have the same motivations. Some judges will
be less concerned with their long-term professional well being than others.
For example, Voeten's research concerning the ECHR found that older
judges were more likely to rule against their home nations.163 ECHR
judges whose careers were primarily in private practice, which presumably
made them less dependent on their national governments for employment,
were also more likely to rule against their home nations.1 64
States could theoretically nominate judges to the ICC who come from
backgrounds that will allow them to exercise a great deal of independence.
Recent research concerning the ICTY and ICTR reveals, however, that the
typical elected judge is in his or her mid-fifties and has usually served as
an appellate judge in his or her home state immediately prior to being
elected.165 This archetype would not seem to lend itself to a great degree of
independence. Moreover, states can choose to nominate only judges who
are highly sensitive to their domestic interests. Voeten notes that one
160. Kahan, supra note 145, at 7.
161. See Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CoNN. L. REv. 1637, 1671
(2012) (collecting scholarship on motivated reasoning and its effect on constitutional law); Donald
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create Good Securities Doctrine?, EMORY L.J. 309, 317 (2002)
(suggesting that motivated reasoning on the part of judges explains securities fraud doctrine). Stuart
Ford has recently suggested that motivated reasoning affects perceptions of the legitimacy of ICTs. See
Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts:
Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405,
409 (2012).
162. See Kahan, supra note 145, at 20 (noting that conscious ends can be subverted by pecuniary
and social interests).
163. See Voeten, supra note 19, at 427. Judges who were nearing the ECHR's retirement age of
seventy were 12% more likely to vote against their national governments than other judges. Id.
164. See id. at 430.
165. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 54-55.
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particularly effective strategy would be to nominate diplomats, who are far
more inclined to rule in favor of their home states than judges from other
backgrounds.1 66 States that wish to reasonably assure themselves that their
nominees will rule in accordance with the national self-interest could
adopt such a strategy and may be able to work with other states to ensure
that their nominees are elected to the ICC and other ICTs.
Even if ICT judges are not actually biased in favor of their nations, the
fact that their nations play the central role in their election and have the
ability to impact their careers at the conclusion of their terms allows for
their impartiality to reasonably be questioned. 167 As the United States
Supreme Court has emphasized, when a party with a personal stake in a
proceeding before a judge has had a significant and disproportionate
influence in securing his or election, the judge is reasonably perceived to
be biased in that party's favor.1 68 In the context of international criminal
trials, it is virtually impossible for judges to be elected absent strong
support from their states, and they will reasonably be perceived as biased
in their states' favor in cases where their states' interests are strongly
implicated.
Indeed, courts have found that relatively minor financial interests in a
proceeding's outcome can create the reasonable apprehension of bias.169
Lord Hewart originated the dictum that "[j]ustice must not only be done,
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" to justify the
disqualification of judges not on the basis of their own financial interests
but those of their deputy clerk.170 It is unclear why ICT judges' far more
substantial financial interests in securing employment at the conclusion of
166. See Voeten, supra note 19, at 430. Four of the eighteen judges initially appointed to the ICC
had spent most of their careers as diplomats. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 59.
167. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 41(2).
168. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868, 882-86 (2009).
169. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (overturning defendant's conviction for
unlawful possession of liquor where the judge, the town's mayor, stood to earn twelve dollars from the
conviction); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (overturning administrative board
proceeding where a board of optometrists had presided over trial of possible competitors); Dimes v.
Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, [1852] 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (H.L.) 315 ("No one can suppose that
Lord Cottenham could be, in the remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this concern;
but, my Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause
should be held sacred."); see also R. v. Bow Street Magistrates, [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L.) 132 ("[Ifj a
judge is in fact a party to the litigation or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome ... the
mere fact that he is a party to the action or has a financial or proprietary interest in its outcome is
sufficient to cause his automatic disqualification.").
170. R. v. Sussex Justice, Ex Parte McCarthy, [1923] 1 K.B. 256 at 259.
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their terms should not give rise to reasonable doubt about their
impartiality. 1
Although ICC judges may strive to be independent and impartial, they
are likely to evaluate conflicts involving their own nations through the
prism of national identity and have strong incentives to rule in accordance
with the national will. States can also nominate judges who are highly
attuned to domestic interests. These factors will naturally lead to doubts as
to their impartiality even in the absence of actual bias. As set out in the
next section, the nature of adjudication at ICTs is such that judges will
rarely be constrained from giving effect to any existing national biases.
3. The Nature of Adjudication at ICTs
International judges, unlike their domestic counterparts, do not have a
common history and legal tradition to draw upon in fulfilling their duties.
Although the last twenty years have resulted in the establishment of a
community of international criminal lawyers and judges, this community's
norms and interpretive practices are only beginning to develop,172 and the
ICC system is sui generis. Consequently, judges at the ICC and other ICTs
have more adjudicative discretion than their domestic counterparts.173
Some scholars have suggested that international judges will not be
influenced by domestic interests and concerns because of monitoring from
the international community.174 This presupposes, however, that judges'
breaches of the duties of independence and impartiality are relatively
171. It is not only the participants to a conflict who might seize upon the nationality of a judge to
seek to undermine the integrity and impartiality of the proceedings. Judge Harhoff, a Danish judge
serving on the ICTY, has alleged that President Meron exerted pressure on colleagues to restrict the
ICTY's jurisprudence on aiding and abetting liability so as to make it less likely that American and
Israeli military leaders could be charged with war crimes. See David Rhode, How International Justice
is Being Gutted, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/
07/how-international-justice-is-being-gutted/277767/. As of the date of this Article, Judge Harhoff has
offered no evidence to support his allegations other than innuendo regarding President Meron's
American and Israeli citizenship. See also supra note 147 (noting personal background of President
Meron).
172. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 248; see also Nancy A. Combs, Legitimizing International
Criminal Justice: The Importance of Process Control, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 321, 325 (2012)
(suggesting that international criminal law had fallen into desuetude after the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals only to be revived and reinvigorated by the establishment of the ICTY and other ICTs).
173. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 58, at 335; Julian Cook, Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 473, 477 (claiming that ICTY rules afford judges "illimitable discretion").
174. See Dannenbaum, supra note 4, at 134; see also Cesare P. R. Romano, The United States and
International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE
UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 419, 441-42 (Cesare P.R. Romano
ed., 2009) ("If [international judges] ... start applying law in a way that might be perceived as biased,
or a cave-in to states' pressure, they undermine their own rationale.").
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simple to detect. International criminal trials are long and fact-intensive,
and judgments are notoriously verbose and dense, making effective
monitoring difficult.1 7 When ICT judgments are criticized, it is usually
because a particular verdict does not match the international community's
(or a particular national community's) sense of a defendant's guilt. 176 ICT
judges are especially unlikely to be criticized when their judgments are
slanted towards liability.1
More importantly, the nature of adjudication at the ICC and other ICTs
is such that judges can often reasonably interpret the facts and law
undergirding cases to consciously or unconsciously fit a preferred
outcome. Although domestic adjudication has political dimensions as
well,1 78 this is an acute problem for the ICC and other ICTs because the
facts and law will rarely compel one conclusion, allowing domestic
politics and judges' personal interests to more regularly enter into the
decision-making process.
a. Fact-Finding by ICTs
One significant challenge for ICTs such as the ICC is that fact-finding
is far more difficult than for domestic courts. Investigations occur during,
or in the immediate aftermath of, armed conflicts, and investigators are
often unable to access war crimes sites.179 Consequently, forensic and
175. For example, the ICC's first judgment in the Lubanga case was widely criticized for being
over 600 pages. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, ICC Delivers Its First Judgment: The Lubanga Case and
Classification of Conflicts in Situations of Occupation, EJIL TALK (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.ejil
talk.org/icc-delivers-its-first-judgment-the-lubanga-case; Dov Jacobs, First Judgment at the ICC:
Sour Random Thoughts, SPREADING THE JAM (Mar. 14, 2012), http://dovjacobs.blogspot.com/
2012/03/first-judgment-at-icc-some-random.html.
176. Cf. Ford, supra note 161, at 410 (suggesting that perceived legitimacy is largely a product of
whom is indicted). The reaction to the ICC's recent acquittal of alleged Congolese warlord Mathieu
Ngudjolo is instructive. See generally David Smith, ICC Acquits Congolese Militia Leader Over
Atrocities, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/dec/18/icc-acquits-
congolese-militia-leader-atrocities (noting that prominent NGOs and international lawyers attributed
Ngudjolo's acquittal to the poor quality of the ICC's prosecutions).
177. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 929; see generally NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING
WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS 228-30 (2010) (describing reasons for ICTs' pro-conviction bias).
178. The United States Supreme Court has been described, for example, as a super-legislature.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 590 (2009); Richard A. Posner, The
Supreme Court 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARv. L. REV. 31, 60 (2005).
179. See Markovic, supra note 57, at 216; see also Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 122 (2009) ("Lacking its own police force, the ICC depends
on state cooperation to conduct its investigations, enforce arrest warrants, and carry out other basic
functions.").
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documentary evidence has not figured prominently in international
criminal trials since Nuremberg, and prosecutors have been forced to
depend primarily on eyewitness testimony.180
Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable in domestic criminal
trials8 and could be even more unreliable in international criminal trials.
One reason is the existence of significant cultural differences between
witnesses and staff.182 Western judges, for example, are known to expect
trustworthy witnesses to maintain eye contact while witnesses from non-
Western cultures tend to avert their eyes out of respect.183 A particular
issue for the ICTR has been that some witnesses who have appeared
before it do not conceive of distance in arithmetic or geographic terms. 184
Even if one assumes that these cultural differences will be less salient
when a judge and the majority of witnesses share the same nationality, 185
many of the witnesses will be unfamiliar with the procedures used by
ICTs.1 86 The fact that international criminal trials often occur years after
the underlying events makes witness testimony all the more unreliable.18
Since eyewitness testimony can be highly unreliable but is nevertheless
integral to modern war crimes trials, judges at the ICC and other ICTs will
often have good cause to credit or discredit eyewitness testimony in cases
involving crimes allegedly committed by or against their nationals, as well
as other cases that strongly affect national interests. A number of
180. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 6, 11-12; see also Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses
in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 219
(2002) ("[I]n most cases [the ICTY] needed substantial numbers of eyewitnesses to prove crimes had
occurred.. . ."). As Combs observes, the Nazi regime was atypical in its mania for recording its many
crimes. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 11.
181. See, e.g., COMBS, supra note 177, at 6; Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the
Inherent Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271, 271 (2007);
Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807,
811-12 (2007).
182. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 4; see also Joshua Karton, Lost in Translation: International
Criminal Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted Testimony, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1, 5 (2008) (suggesting that inaccuracies introduced by interpretation process can impede ICTs' search
for truth).
183. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 80 (summarizing research involving immigrant witnesses in
the United States).
184. See id. at 81-82 (citations omitted).
185. There can be, of course, significant cultural differences within countries. See David M.
Crane, White lan 's Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional Third World Conflicts, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2012) (describing justice as "locally, culturally oriented" vis-a-vis
Africa).
186. See COMBS, supra note 177, at 4.
187. See Ruth Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International
War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267, 269 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of fresh and
immediate eyewitness testimony).
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prominent international criminal trials have turned on differences of
opinion concerning the credibility of key witnesses, but judges could
question the reliability of testimony in virtually every international
criminal trial. Nancy Combs's study of trial transcripts at the ICTR and
SCSL reveals, for example, that more than fifty percent of prosecution
witnesses testified in ways that were seriously inconsistent with their
pretrial statements. 188
The ICTY's handing of crucial testimony in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic
offers a vivid illustration.189 In this case, the ICTY Trial Chamber heard
testimony from an eyewitness who had identified the defendants as having
perpetrated an attack upon her village.190 However, in her pre-trial
statements she claimed that she had seen her father killed by gunfire and
the defendants set fire to the upper floor of her family home.1 91 These
claims were repudiated during her testimony. 192 The Trial Chamber found
the witness to be credible because she had never wavered in her
identification of the defendants, whereas the Appeals Chamber held that
reliance on the witness's testimony had been "wholly erroneous" based on
the aforementioned inconsistencies. 193
Kupreskic is somewhat anomalous because ICT judges rarely
emphasize discrepancies in witness testimony. 194 For example, in the CDF
case, the SCSL heard important testimony from an alleged comrade of the
defendants who claimed that he had tortured and cut off the ear of a man
named Joseph Lansana from Sorgia and killed his mother on orders from
the defendants. 195 The defense called Mr. Lansana to testify. 196 He stated
that his mother had died before the events in question and then
dramatically displayed his intact ears to the court. 197 The Trial Chamber
overlooked these conspicuous inconsistencies in what was the crucial
testimony against the CDF defendants and convicted them.1 98
188. COMBS, supra note 177, at 5.
189. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals Judgment, 223 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001).
190. See id.
191. Id. 223-24.
192. Id.
193. Id. 224.
194. COMBS, supra note 177, at 8.
195. Id. at 211.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 212-13. The judgment was sustained on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Fofana and
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, 565 (May 28, 2008).
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The judgments in Kupreskic and the CDF case tend to suggest that
judges can, without fear of substantial criticism, either ignore
discrepancies in the evidence so as to convict a defendant or emphasize
these discrepancies to justify an acquittal. Most international criminal
trials may not involve clear contradictions in testimony, but witness
testimony will rarely be so convincing and incontrovertible that it will
compel judges at the ICC and other ICTs to rule in a particular manner.1 99
In most international criminal trials, the evidence will be sufficiently
ambiguous such that it can be consciously or unconsciously interpreted to
fit a preferred outcome.
b. Indeterminacy of Legal Analysis
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs also have a great deal of discretion in
terms of legal analysis. This can be partly attributed to the relative
newness of the international criminal law regime but also because
international criminal law purports to punish human rights violators and
vindicate the rights of victims while fully safeguarding the rights of
defendants. 200 This inevitably leads to conflict because, as Mirjan
Damaska has observed, "[w]hen the interests of the criminal defendant and
victims both vie for judicial attention, a point is soon reached beyond
which the desire to satisfy the victims' interests begins to impinge on
considerations of fairness toward the defendants." 201 The ICTY has used
the protection of victims' rights as one of its main rationales to justify the
extrapolation of the Geneva Conventions' provisions concerning
international armed conflicts to internal conflicts and to expand the scope
of command responsibility.202
This jurisprudential conflict between the rights of victims and
defendants was starkly exhibited in the ICC Appeals Chamber's decision
concerning the participation of victims in ICC trial proceedings.203
199. See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Judgment, 64 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("[T]wo judges, both acting reasonably, can come to
different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence.").
200. See generally Robinson, supra note 3, at 930-31 (postulating that there is an identity crisis in
international criminal law because of its inability to reconcile the protection of human rights with the
protection of the rights of criminal defendants).
201. Damaska, supra note 58, at 334.
202. Robinson, supra note 3, at 936-37; see also Damaska, supra note 58, at 356 (criticizing ICTs
for applying tenuous doctrines of criminal participation and loosening evidentiary requirements).
203. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the Appeals of the
Prosecutor and the Defence Against the Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 19
January 2008, 109 (July 11, 2008).
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Although the ICC Statute does not explicitly grant victims the right to
present evidence or challenge the admissibility of evidence, a majority of
the Appeals Chamber held that:
To give effect to the spirit and intention of . .. the Statute in the
context of trial proceedings [the victim participation provisions]
must be interpreted so as to make participation by victims
meaningful . . . . If victims were generally and under all
circumstances precluded from tendering evidence relating to the
guilt or innocence of the accused and from challenging the
admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to participate in
the trial would potentially become ineffectual.204
The dissents by Judges Pikis and Kirsch conversely focused on, inter alia,
the imposition that such robust participation would have on the fair trial
rights of the defendant.205
Judges at the ICC and other ICTs do not necessarily err when they
interpret legal materials in such a way as to maximize the rights and
interests of victims, particularly when deciding issues of first impression,
but they might equally reasonably be focused on a defendant's entitlement
to a fair trial.206 A judge who is concerned with domestic political interests
can reasonably prioritize one set of rights over another to consciously or
unconsciously achieve a preferred outcome.
Even where the law seems relatively clear, a judge may offer a novel
interpretation of the law based on the unique facts of a given case. A
notable example is Justice Thompson's dissent in the CDF case.20  The
CDF case involved Sierra Leonean defendants who were alleged to have
committed war crimes while fighting to restore the country's
204. Id. 197.
205. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Partly Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Pikis, 19 (July 11, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Partly
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kirsch, 23 (July 12, 2008) ("[D]etermining that it is the parties that lead
evidence on guilt or innocence, and not the victims, is consistent with the overall desire to ensure that
proceedings at the ICC are both fair and expeditious.").
206. Presumably as international criminal law-including the ICC in particular-continues to
develop and expand its jurisprudence, it will favor victims with respect to certain legal issues and favor
defendants with respect to others. But even then, reasonable judges will disagree as to precise contours
of each group's rights and how to apply the developed legal doctrine to the cases before them. See also
Damaska, supra note 58, at 333-34 (suggesting that conflicts between victims' and defendants' rights
implicate more fundamental questions concerning procedural justice versus substantive justice).
207. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Separate Concurring and Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute, I 1 (Aug. 2,
2007) [hereinafter Thompson Dissent].
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democratically elected government. 208 The chief defendant, Sam Hinga
Norman, had been a minister in the Sierra Leonean government prior to
his indictment.209
Norman died before trial, 210 and the other CDF defendants were
convicted by the SCSL.211 Justice Thompson, a national of Sierra Leone,
dissented from the Trial Chamber's judgment, however, on the basis that
the defendants' crimes could be excused by the defenses of necessity and
212Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est.
Justice Thompson's dissent is notable apart from the commonality
between his nationality and that of the CDF defendants. Justice Thompson
raised the defenses of necessity and Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est213 sua
sponte although neither defense is mentioned in the SCSL Statute.
Moreover, no ICT has ever held that necessity or Salus Civis Suprema Lex
Est could be used as a justification or excuse for war crimes, and
precedents from Nuremberg would seem to prohibit, or at least greatly
restrict, such defenses.214
The reliance on the Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est defense seems
especially questionable. Justice Thompson addresses it in five short
paragraphs without a citation to any authority that suggests that the
215doctrine is a recognized defense to war crimes2. The defense is also
difficult to reconcile with the text of the SCSL Statute, which provides that
"[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal
208. See Jane Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 302 (2007).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 303.
211. See Discussion Part ll.B.3.a supra.
212. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, 69, 93. Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est means "the
safety of the state is the supreme law." Id. 193.
213. Id. 4.
214. See United States v. Wilhelm List et al., ("Hostage Case"), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 757, 1272
(1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/NT war-criminalsVol-XI.pdf
("[T]he rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a
war."); see also U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, The Krupp Trial, 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 147, 149 (1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/Law-Reports
Vol-10.pdf (suggesting that the necessity defense is only available when "the act charged was done to
avoid an evil, severe and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the
remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.").
215. Thompson cites to Kant, Salmond, and a Supreme Court of Sierra Leone opinion that
establishes only that the State has a monopoly on force within its territory. Thompson Dissent, supra
note 207, 94-96.
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responsibility." 216 If a specific government order to commit an act will not
excuse the act, then it would seem to follow that the act should not be
excused when the defendant commits the act to protect the state of his or
her own accord. Justice Thompson did not address this problematic
language in the SCSL Statute.
Justice Thompson's rationale for invoking the necessity defense is
more convincing. He notes that the ICJ has recognized the defense and
that many municipal systems similarly allow for it.217 However, neither of
the ICJ cases he cites relates to international criminal law nor addresses
whether the necessity defense should be available in a prosecution for war
crimes.218 Justice Thompson also fails to explain why the defendants'
commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes were necessary to
restore Sierra Leone's government. In his view, because the defendants
were "fighting for the restoration of democracy and constitutional
legitimacy . . . [this compelled] disobedience to a supranational regime of
~,219
proscriptive norms. " Under Justice Thompson's formulation of the
defense, any war crime committed as part of a just war should be excused.
Although Justice Thompson's dissent may be unconvincing, it is not
self-evidently specious. The SCSL Statute does not specifically prohibit
either the necessity or Salus Civis Suprema Lex Est defense. The ICC
Statute and municipal law in many nations do provide for a necessity
defense.220 In addition, the mere fact that the acceptance of these defenses
may be novel in the context of a war crimes prosecution does not mean
that they are inapplicable. 221 Defenses that originally apply in one context
are sometimes recognized to extend to related contexts.222
216. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(4), Aug. 14, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138
[hereinafter SCSL Statute], available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndlMJe
Ew%3d&tabid=176.
217. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, 77, 79-80, 84.
218. ZOILA HINSON, SIERRA LEONE COURT MONITORING PROGRAMME, JUSTICE BANKOLE
THOMPSON'S OPINION IN THE CDF CASE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 7 (2007), available at http://
www.carl-sl.org/home/images/stories/essay/Essay SeriesI.pdf.
219. Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, 90.
220. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 31(1)(c); Thompson Dissent, supra note 207, 80-81.
221. Indeed, in recognizing the necessity defense, see ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 31(1)(d), the
ICC Statute appears to contemplate that it will be raised in the context of a prosecution of crimes
against humanity and war crimes because the ICC has jurisdiction only over such crimes. See id. art. 5.
222. Self-defense, for example, justifies the defense of others. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)
(1962). The right of self-defense under customary international law has also been viewed as the basis
for the humanitarian intervention doctrine. See David Rodin, The Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for
Crimes of Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 591, 592 (2007) ("If one interprets self-
defense to include the defense of others, then it is also possible to view the emerging norm of
humanitarian intervention as part of the extended right of self and other-defense.").
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Even if one strongly disagrees with Justice Thompson's dissent, it is
unclear that the legal analysis is so erroneous that it must have been
motivated by a conscious or unconscious desire to acquit the CDF fighters.
While Justice Thompson was unable to convince his international
colleagues on the SCSL Trial Chamber to acquit the CDF defendants, the
Chamber did use the fact that the CDF defendants had been fighting a just
war as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 223 The Trial Chamber imposed
sentences of six and eight years imprisonment compared to sentences of
forty-five and fifty years that had previously been imposed upon rebel
defendants. 224 The sentencing judgment was ultimately reversed by the
SCSL Appeals Chamber, however, and the defendants' sentences were
increased to fifteen and twenty years.225 The Appeals Chamber's one
Sierra Leonean justice would have maintained the lower sentences.226
Whether Justice Thompson was influenced by domestic considerations
or self-interest is unknowable.22 If he had been so influenced, this would
not have necessarily undermined the work of the SCSL because hybrid
tribunals seek to reflect local sentiment, and the service of nationals on
such courts is intended to foster local ownership of the proceedings. 228 As
an SCSL justice, Justice Thompson was not representing "the international
community as a whole" as he would have been if he served on the ICC.229
But rarely will the facts or law of a case be so clear that ICT judges will be
unable to give effect to their national biases and even arguably specious
opinions cannot necessarily be attributed to a judge's failure to maintain
independence and impartiality.
223. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on the Sentencing of
Momma Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 79-91 (Oct. 9, 2007).
224. Id., Disposition.
225. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, 565 (May 28,
2008).
226. Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-01-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion
of Honourable Justice George Gebaga King, 26-31 (May 28, 2008).
227. Justice Thompson was nominated by Sierra Leone to the ICC in 2011, but he was not elected.
See ICC Election of Judges, December 2011-Results of the First Round, INT'L CRIM. COURT (Dec.
15, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.intlen menus/asp/elections/judges/201 1/results/Pages/1st%20round.aspx.
228. See David Cohen, "Hybrid Justice" in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: Lessons
Learned and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2, 6 (2007). But see Elizabeth Burch,
Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1, 12 (2010)
(describing local participation as a veneer to mask sharp differences between international and national
justice).
229. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
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III. OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
Thus far this Article has contended that judges at the ICC and future
ICTs cannot be expected to separate themselves from their national
identities in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by or against their
nationals. Judges should also consider voluntarily recusing themselves in
other cases that strongly implicate the interests of their nations. This Part
will explore whether this Article's focus on national identity is
counterproductive to the advancement of international criminal justice and
fails to account for the increasing cosmopolitanism of judges at the ICC
and other ICTs. This Part will also address whether recusal should be
automatic in cases involving crimes committed by or against a judge's
fellow nationals.
A The Legitimacy of International Criminal Trials
For the ICC and future ICTs to fulfill their goals, they must be
perceived to mete out justice fairly and impartially.230 In particular, to
promote "truth and reconciliation," the individuals and nations most
affected by the crimes at issue must accept international criminal trials as
legitimate.
One of the main challenges facing the ICC and future ICTs is that there
will often be a "mismatch" between domestic narratives surrounding a
conflict and what actually transpired.232 This mismatch will make it
difficult for the parties to a conflict to accept international criminal trials
as legitimate.233 In the long term, however, ICTs may be able break down
the erroneous narratives perpetrated by the conflict's participants and force
234them to take responsibility for their actions2. For example, opinion of the
Nuremberg Tribunal was overwhelmingly negative in West Germany in
the 1950s. 235 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, West Germans began to
acknowledge the enormity of their nation's crimes in World War II based
230. See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 506.
231. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2010); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of
International Criminal Iaw Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 Tx. INT'L L.J. 729, 736-37
(2003).
232. See Ford, supra note 161, at 411.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 469 (citing Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and Its Impact on Germany,
4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 800, 812-13 (2006)).
39
40 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW
in part on evidence collected by the Nuremberg Tribunal. 236 The ICTY has
also had some success in convincing Serbs of the occurrence of crimes
such as the shelling of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre after years of
disbelief and resistance.23
One potential objection to this Article's proposal that judges at the ICC
and other ICTs be disqualified from certain trials on the basis of
nationality is that it risks undermining international criminal justice by
deflecting attention away from the crimes committed by the parties to a
conflict. To dismiss inconvenient legal conclusions from the ICC and
other ICTs, the parties can claim that the judges are biased because of
national allegiances or other personal traits. Such claims are difficult to
disprove.
If the main purpose of international criminal trials is to combat "mass
denial" 238 on the part of a conflict's participants, then any criticism of
ICTs could be seen as counterproductive to the fulfillment of this goal.
However, acknowledging and accounting for national bias in certain cases
can help to legitimize the work of ICTs by making charges of "victor's
justice" appear less credible.239 Indeed, perhaps part of the reason for the
slow acceptance of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICTY by the people of
Germany and Serbia respectively is because these tribunals were staffed in
ways that inevitably raised concerns about their impartiality. As noted,
only judges from the major Allied Powers were permitted to sit on the
Nuremberg Tribunal, 240 and judges from the major NATO countries have
been de facto guaranteed ICTY judgeships if they desired them by virtue
of their membership on the United Nations Security Council.241
Although no judge may be fully disinterested when adjudicating crimes
that "deeply shock the conscience of humanity,"242 some judges can more
credibly claim to be disinterested than others. For example, judges from
democratic South American countries-that had little at stake in the
Yugoslavia conflict-would have presumably been ideal appointees to the
236. Id.
237. See id. at 470-71 (internal citations omitted).
238. Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79, 88
(2010).
239. See generally Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV.
915, 921-23 (2003) (noting that claims regarding the ICTY as "victor's justice" resonated in Serbia
because the Security Council created the ICTY, and it was not a neutral party to the Yugoslavia
conflict).
240. IMT Charter, supra note 5, art. 2.
241. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 48; Scharf, supra note 239, at 921.
242. ICC Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.
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ICTY.243 Research suggests that these judges were underrepresented at the
expense of Western judges who had a far greater interest in the conflict. 244
In fact, if the primary goal of the ICTY was to break down erroneous
domestic narratives about the Yugoslavia conflict, the ICTY should have
been staffed with judges from nations in which the participants to the
Yugoslavia conflict placed trust. 245 The ICTY's first judicial election,
however, saw the defeat of Russia's nominee because a majority of the
Security Council apparently feared that he would be partial to Serbia. 246
The mere recognition that national bias may impact some international
criminal trials does not mean that it is a factor in all trials. Cases involving
crimes allegedly committed by or against a judge's fellow nationals are
unique because a judge cannot reasonably be expected to psychologically
separate himself or herself from his or her national community. In such
cases there will be more pressure to rule in accordance with the national
will. This Article does not claim that judges cannot act as representatives
of the "international community as a whole" 247 in trials that do not
implicate these concerns.
This Article has also proposed that judges at the ICC and other ICTs
consider whether their nations' involvement in a particular conflict might
raise concerns about their impartiality in other cases that do not involve
crimes allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals. 248 An
example would be a case related to a conflict in which a judge's nation has
been arming one side. In such a situation, the judge may not have a
psychological connection to either of the warring parties, but it may
nevertheless be in his or her self-interest to sympathize with the side
supported by his or her home state. The judge would also very likely be
viewed as partial to that side. For these reasons, the judge should consider
recusing himself or herself but need not do so because support for one side
of a conflict is not necessarily incompatible with seeking to ensure that no
243. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49.
244. Id.
245. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE Us 54-
55 (2009) ("An attempted refutation by an untrustworthy source can be taken as additional evidence in
favor of [false] beliefs. ... If people ... have a degree of trust in those who are providing the
correction, then false beliefs will dissipate.").
246. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 49. This is not to say that the Security Council was
wrong to consider whether the Russian judge might be partial to Serbia, but it should have also
considered whether NATO judges might be partial (or be seen to be partial) to other participants in the
Yugoslavia conflict.
247. ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
248. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2011) (requiring U.S. federal judges to disqualify themselves in
any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned).
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crimes committed in that conflict go unpunished. 249 Any recusal decision
would, of course, be subject to review by his or her colleagues.250 To
appear as neutral as possible, however, ICTs would ideally try defendants
before chambers that consist of judges from nations that have little vested
interested in the conflict.
B. Cosmopolitan Judges
This Article's focus on nationality as a salient personal characteristic
could also be seen as outdated. Although the state has historically been the
251
chief source in the shaping of personal identity, identity has become
more complex and subjective with globalization and the increasing
movement of individuals across borders.252 Thomas Franck has claimed
that "[N]ationalism is in retreat. . . . [I]ndividualism has emerged . .. as an
increasingly preferred alternative to self-definition imposed by
nationalism's genetic and territorial imperatives." 2 53 The philosopher
Martha Nussbaum has referred to nationality as a "morally irrelevant
characteristic" and has suggested that national citizenship should give way
to "cosmopolitanism," whereby each person is first and foremost "a citizen
of the world" and "puts right before country and universal reason before
the symbols of belonging." 25 4
Such ideas are not new, of course. Cosmopolitanism originated with
the Greek stoic philosopher Diogenes Laertius.255  However, in an
increasingly globalized world, it is conceivable that national citizenship
has begun to give way to a more universal citizenship.256 The European
Union ("EU") originally began as an organization devoted to economic
integration but is increasingly legislating in other areas in order "to
construct an identity for the Union that goes beyond economic issues and
249. This would particularly be the case if the judge's home nation consistently condemned war
crimes committed by all sides of the conflict.
250. Potential problems with judicial review of disqualification motions are acknowledged infra
Part HI.C.
251. See FRANCK, supra note 30, at 6.
252. See id. at 9-10.
253. Id. at 1.
254. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 5, 6, 17.
255. See id. at 6.
256. See Smith, supra note 103, at 224. But see Denis Sindic, National Identities: Are They
Declining?, BEYOND CuRRENT HORiZONs 6 (Dec. 2008), http://www.beyondcurrenthorizons.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/final sindic nationalidentities_20081201.pdf (reviewing studies that indicate that
internet use strengthens nationalist identities).
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can therefore claim deeper bonds of allegiance over time."257 Future
generations of Europeans might view themselves primarily as "European"
or even "citizens of the world" as opposed to nationals of specific states.
Even if cosmopolitan identities do not become ascendant, international
judges would seem to be far more cosmopolitan than their fellow
nationals. The proliferation of international tribunals has created a global
community of international judges who see one another "'not only as
servants and representatives of a particular polity, but also as fellow
professionals in a common judicial enterprise that transcends national
borders.' 258 International judges tend to share similar educational and
professional experiences and are increasingly exhibiting a shared
understanding of the judicial function.259
With respect to ICT judges in particular, their expected qualifications
are becoming standardized, 260 and groups such as the Independent Panel
on ICC Judicial Elections press state parties to nominate only the most
highly qualified candidates to the ICC.261 ICT judges network and many
will end up serving on more than one ICT. 2 Disqualifying judges from
international criminal trials on the basis of nationality might seem
unnecessary at a time when states are able to draw on a highly professional
community of ICT judges devoted to the development of shared norms
and practices.263
Although globalization and other such forces have undoubtedly
changed the way individuals conceptualize their national identities, there is
little data to support the view that national identities are growing weaker,
let alone being replaced by cosmopolitan identities.264 Eurobarometer data
shows that only a small percentage of Europeans reject all sense of
national pride, and national pride has actually increased in most European
257. Jenia Jontcheva Turner, The Expressive Dimensions of EU Criminal Law, 60 AM. J. COMp. L.
555, 573 (2012); see also Kathleen R. McNamara, Constructing Authority in the European Union, in
WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE?, supra note 29, at 166-73 (describing various mechanisms used by the
EU to construct "an image of a bounded political and social space").
258. Daniel Terris et al., Toward a Community of International Judges, 30 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
CoMp. L. REv. 419, 420 (2008) (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 193 (2003)).
259. Id. at 419; see also Smith, supra note 103, at 224 (suggesting that international judges form a
homogeneous epistemic community).
260. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 58.
261. See INDEPENDENT PANEL ON ICC JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, http://www.iccindependentpanel.org/
about (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
262. Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 46.
263. Id.
264. See Denis Sindic, Psychological Citizenship and National Identity, 21 J. COMM. APPL. Soc.
PSYCH. 202, 209 (2011).
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countries since the founding of the EU. 265 Attachments to Europe are in
fact significantly weaker than national attachments.266 Prominent EU
supporters have suggested that EU membership may actually foster
stronger national allegiances.26  There is no reason to believe that a
commitment to cosmopolitanism is incompatible with a strong sense of
national identity.268
It is also possible that when individuals identify as "European" or
"citizens of the world," they are primarily seeking to disassociate
themselves from some of the negative connotations associated with a
surfeit of national pride.269 Many aspects of national identity are banal and
taken for granted until one's national identity is threatened. 270 National
identity is highly likely, however, to assume far more importance at a time
of crisis such as a war.271
Judges are nominated to serve on the ICC and other ICTs by states, and
judges will be at least somewhat beholden to their states' views and
interests. But even if nomination practices were to change and ICT judges
were to embrace cosmopolitanism, ICT judges might still fail to represent
international norms and values in all cases.
This is because cosmopolitan judges will be prone to underestimate
their own latent national biases. The psychological phenomenon of
discrediting views of oneself that threaten one's membership in a group is
272known as identity-protective cognition. A cosmopolitan judge would be
disinclined to consider that his or her view of a case might be affected by
his or her national identity, even if his or her nation's interests were very
much implicated in the case.273 Identity-protective cognition might also
lead judges at the ICC and other ICTs to take for granted that they are
disseminating international legal norms and values, notwithstanding
265. See id. at 207.
266. See Sindic, supra note 256, at 7.
267. Id. at 8.
268. See also Hilary Putnam, Must We Choose, in FOR LovE OF COUNTRY?, supra note 30, at 97
("We all have to live and judge from within our particular inheritances .... [W]e do not have to
choose between patriotism and universal reason; critical intelligence and loyalty to what is best in our
traditions, including our national and ethnic traditions, are interdependent.").
269. See Sindic, supra note 264, at 209.
270. Id. at 206; Sindic, supra note 256, at 3.
271. Sindic, supra note 256, at 3.
272. See Kahan, supra note 145, at 20-21.
273. See Terris, supra note 258, at 421 ("[A]n overdeveloped sense of community among judges
has the potential to lead to a form of 'corporate solidarity' that could deflect constructive criticism and
stifle new thinking."); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 245, at 89 (noting that insulated groups tend to
suppress dissent and exhibit worse decision-making).
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longstanding concerns that ICTs are dominated by Anglo-Saxon legal
274
norms and values.
This is not to say that judges at the ICC and other ICTs should eschew
cosmopolitanism. However, regardless of a judge's sense of self, national
bias is likely to impact his or her decision-making in cases that are of most
interest to his or her nation. Nor will cosmopolitan judges necessarily
reflect the international community and its interests better than judges who
understand that they are connected to the international community largely
275through their relationships to their own states.
C. Are Automatic Recusals Necessary?
This Article has proposed that judges be automatically disqualified
from hearing cases involving crimes committed by or against their fellow
nationals but not in other cases that might implicate their nations'
interests. ICTs have procedures to adjudicate disqualification motions,
however, and do not rely on individual judges to assess their own
biases.276 If a judge is in the position to hear a case in which his or her
nationality is highly relevant and he or she does not recuse himself or
herself, the judge can presumably be disqualified by his or her colleagues,
rendering automatic disqualifications unnecessary.
The prospect that judges at the ICC and other ICTs will disqualify
colleagues on nationality-based grounds is highly remote. In the first
place, for a judge's role to be scrutinized in a given case, a party must
move for the judge's disqualification. However, defense counsel may fear
that a failed disqualification motion will cause the judge to be negatively
predisposed towards the accused. Conversely, defense counsel may
believe that national bias will augur in the accused's favor. Prosecutors
274. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 29, at 46 (noting perception that ICTs are dominated by
Anglo-Saxon norms and practices); see also Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav
and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 168 (1997) (claiming that the Nuremberg
Tribunal marked the beginning of the ascendancy of Anglo-Saxon legal hegemony).
275. Michael Walzer has suggested in response to Nussbaum that allegiances should be
understood as forming a series of concentric circles and that "we begin by understanding what it
means to have fellow citizens and neighbors; without that understanding, we are morally lost. Then we
extend the sense of moral fellowship . .. to new groups of people, and ultimately to all people."
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Affection, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY?, supra note 30, at 126.
276. The ICTY's Bureau, which consists of the President, the Vice-President, and the Presiding
Judges of the Trial Chambers, decides disqualification motions at the ICTY. See Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, R. P. Evid. 2 & 15(b), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (2011), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules procedure evidence/it032rev46e.pdf. The ICC
resolves disqualification motions in a plenary session of all of its judges. ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 92, Rule 4(2).
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may be reluctant to make disqualification motions altogether since they
appear before the same judges in different cases.2  An ICT's legitimacy
may also be undermined by the time the disqualification motion is
made.278
When parties have moved to disqualify ICT judges on nationality-
based grounds, their motions have been rejected. 279 This is not entirely
surprising because judges tend to be reluctant to question the
independence and impartiality of fellow judges, 28 0 and in past cases where
defendants have sought to disqualify judges on nationality-based grounds,
the impugned judges have stridently proclaimed their independence and
impartiality.21 To grant disqualification motions under such circumstances
would require rebuking colleagues. By acknowledging that a judge's
nationality can impact his or her decision-making, ICT judges would also
legitimize nationality-based challenges to their own independence and
impartiality in future cases. All ICT judges are nationals of certain states
and would not have been elected without support from their states.
Even assuming that ICTs were prepared to recognize the existence of
national bias, they cannot discern either its effect on specific judges or in
which cases it will appear. There are no reliable indicia of a judge's
identification with his or her national polity or whether he or she is under
277. See also Richard E. Flamm, History and Problems With the Federal Disqualification
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 751, 762 (2010) ("Although a litigant is unlikely to appear before a
particular judge again, and therefore may feel that she has little to lose in seeking that judge's removal,
an attorney who frequently handles litigation in federal court is likely to be less than eager to make or
endorse a recusal motion for one client if she perceives that doing so may prejudice her ability to
effectively litigate before that judge in future cases.").
278. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011
B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 973 ("[B]y the time the recusal decision is ultimately made and publicized, the
public has already observed the conduct and the events that negatively affect its perception of the
judiciary and formed its own, often negative, opinions about judicial impartiality."). This effect is
likely amplified in the international realm because most citizens will only begin to closely follow the
work of an ICT such as the ICC when it adjudicates cases involving their countries, and initial
impressions of bias may be difficult to overcome. See also id. at 974 (suggesting that recusal does not
fully restore faith in the impartiality of the proceedings) (citations omitted).
279. See discussion supra Introduction.
280. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters Again, 30 REv.
LITIG. 671, 728-29 (2011) (discussing judges' ambivalence towards disqualification motions and
tendency to err on the side of non -disqualification); see also Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, 1
CI. J. INT'L L. 189, 196 (2000) (suggesting that the ICTY is more collegial than domestic courts).
281. See Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Order Denying Defence Motion Pursuant
to Rule 15(B) Seeking Disqualification of Presiding Judge Alphons Orie and for a Stay of
Proceedings, annex, 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2012); Prosecutor v.
Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the Plenary of the Judges on the
"Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge" of 2 April 2012, 8 (June 5, 2012) (noting that
"a number of judges expressed concerns about the length and tone of [Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji's]
submission" on his recusal).
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conscious or subconscious pressure to rule in a particular manner.282 The
lack of clear judiciable standards in assessing nationality-based
disqualification necessitates a prophylactic rule for those cases where
national bias is most likely to have an effect. Not every judge will be
incapable of maintaining impartiality and independence in cases involving
crimes committed by or against his or her fellow nationals, but national
bias is likely to be more prevalent and significant in such cases.
CONCLUSION
Although international criminal trials since Nuremberg have been
perceived to be fair and impartial,283 a growing literature has begun to
question core assumptions concerning ICTs, including whether their
proceedings are substantively biased against defendants.284 This Article
has sought to challenge another core assumption, that an ICT judge's
nationality has no bearing on his or her decision-making.
The ICTR and ICTY have held that national identity is irrelevant to
how a judge performs his or her duties, while the ICC has permitted a
Ugandan judge to hear an appeal involving the LRA 285 and a Nigerian
judge to adjudicate attacks on Nigerian peacekeepers.286  ICTs are
anomalous among international tribunals in failing to control for national
bias even though nominations to ICTs are controlled by states, and few
tribunals hear cases as sensitive and controversial as ICTs.
282. This is illustrated by the summary nature of ICTs' analysis of nationality -based
disqualification motions. For example, the ICC disposed of the claim that Nigerian Judge Chile Eboe-
Osuji should be disqualified from a case where the alleged victims were predominately Nigerians in a
single paragraph. See Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision
of the Plenary of the Judges on the "Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge" of 2 April
2012, 15 (June 5, 2012); see also Introduction, supra (discussing disqualification motion filed by
Mladic defense team).
283. See Ford, supra note 161, at 415; Stromseth, supra note 208, at 319-20; Antonio Cassese,
The ICTY A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 585, 586 (2004) ("[T]he ICTY not only
got off the ground but has since proved to be a superb judicial enterprise, capable of dispensing justice
in a fair manner. . ."); see also Turner, supra note 59, at 582 (noting that a majority of ICTY and
ICTR defense attorneys believed the proceedings to be apolitical).
284. See supra note 177.
285. See Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Case No.ICC-02/040A, Judgment on the "Decision on
victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06, a/0082/06,
a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06,
a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06" of Pre-Trial
Chamber II, I 1 (Feb. 23, 2009).
286. See Prosecutor v. Nourain & Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-344-Anx, Decision of the
Plenary of the Judges on the "Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge" of 2 April 2012,
9 & 33 (June 5, 2012).
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This Article does not contend that national bias will affect judging in
all cases. However, judges are unlikely to act as true representatives of the
international community in cases involving crimes allegedly committed by
or against their fellow nationals, and judges will be under direct or indirect
pressure to rule in accordance with domestic considerations in other cases
that strongly implicate the interests of their states. ICTs should also
recognize that the parties to a conflict will be less likely to challenge the
legitimacy of international criminal trials if judges do not participate in
trials in which their nations have a substantial stake.
The ICTR and ICTY were perceived to be political courts from their
inception and may not have been in a position to acknowledge nationality-
based challenges to the impartiality of their judges.28  However,
international criminal justice has advanced such that recourse to the ICC is
no longer considered especially controversial. 288 The ICC and future ICTs,
unlike the ad hoc tribunals, can acknowledge that judges are not always
impervious to the interests of their states.
The ICC and future ICTs should not place judges in the position of
having to represent the international community in cases involving crimes
allegedly committed by or against their fellow nationals. Judges should
also consider recusing themselves in other cases that substantially
implicate the interests of their states. A belief in international criminal
justice is not incompatible with the recognition that judges' national
allegiances do not entirely dissipate once they assume the robes of office.
287. This is because the ICTY and ICTR were created by the Security Council to prosecute
specific crimes. See Jose E. Alvarez, Accounting for Accountability, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1003, 1014 (1999) ("[W]hile the ad hoc tribunals do not represent 'victor's justice,' the circumstances
of their creation, as well as the limits to their jurisdiction, have undermined their claim to apolitical
neutrality."); see also Mikas Kalinauskas, Comment, The Use of International Military Force in
Arresting War Criminals: The Lessons of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 425 (2002) (noting that the ICTY established an outreach office
in Serbia to explain the apolitical nature of its work).
288. The fact that the ICC was created by treaty also makes it less susceptible to claims that it is a
political court. See Alvarez, supra note 287, at 1014. But see Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice
Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 583, 612-13 (2007) (suggesting that the ICC can never be completely apolitical).
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